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DIRECT PLACEMENTS
VERSUS PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Because of the greatly increased importance of direct placements now
as compared with the Hickman era, the task of analyzing the quality
of these issues is crucial to the entire study. This chapter explains those
characteristics of directly placed issues that are important to quality,
and the prewar history of these bonds; it then examines what evidence
is available on their postwar quality.
Volume and Characteristics
As was indicated earlier, the most profound change in the corporate
bond market in the postwar period has been the coming of age of direct
placements as distinguished from underwritten issues offered to the
public at large.1 Direct placements have considerable advantages to the
borrower and even more to the lender. The borrower, in effect, trades
a slightly higher rate of interest for flexibility and assured financing.2
The lender receives possibly a higher rate of interest in return for
relinquishing some degree of marketability.
The result of these advantages has been a great increase in the pro-
portion of bond issues classified as direct placements. From 1900 to
1943, the period covered by Hickman's study, direct placements of
cash offerings constituted only 7.2 per cent of the total amount reaching
the market.3 From 1948—65 the corresponding proportion was 46.0 per
cent (see Table 2).
The development of direct placements has important implications
for a study of corporate bond quality. It is really not the degree of
"publicness" of a bond that has much to do with ultimate quality but
1 The National Bureau of Economic Research now uses the term "direct place-
ment" to indicate bonds not marketed to the general public. The Hickman study
defined private placements as those with less than twenty-five investors participating.
Neither term is strictly correct, since bonds not offered generally to the market are
not necessarily private nor directly made.
2 See George T. Conklin, Jr., "Direct Placements," Journal of Finance, June 1951,
pp. 85—118.
3 Hickman, Volume of Corporate Bond Financing, p. 94, Table 8.22 Trendsin Corporate Bond Quality
rather other attributes that tend to be associated with the method of
marketing the obligation. Since nearly all direct placements are taken
by large institutions fully able to judge bond quality, publicity that
might otherwise be a safeguard presumably is not missed. Furthermore,
many institutions purchasing direct placements can forgo the added
liquidity of public issues because of the forecastable nature of their
cash needs. Indeed, insurance companies are by far the largest pur-
chasers of direct placements. The development of direct placements,
however, has led to a large informational gap. In the first place, some
direct placements fail to receive any public notice, and those that are
announced may have undisclosed terms. Second, only a small percent-
age of corporate direct placements receive ratings from the recognized
agencies, although those sold to insurance companies do receive pre-
sumably comparable ratings. Third, market rating measures may not
reflect the collective judgment of the market place about the proper
yield of the security, but instead may be a matter of negotiation heavily
influenced by bargaining position and ability. Finally, because of the
ease in changing contracts, what otherwise might be a default may in a
direct placement simply become an unpublicized contract modification.
Therefore, it should be understood that measurement of quality for di-
rect placements is considerably more difficult than for public offerings.
The Prewar Experience
The quality of direct placements in the 1920's and 1930'sisen-
couraging. Table 6 shows that, on the average, 0.15 per cent of the
TABLE 6
Direct Placements and All Corporate Bonds, Percentage of





Placements All Bonds .
1920-29 0.15 0.95
1930-39 1.22 3.20
Source: Hickman, Volume of Corporate Bond Financing, Table 22,
p. 20S, and data compiled by Corporate Bond Research Project, on
file at NBER.Direct Placements Versus Public Offerings 23
outstanding private placements defaulted each year during the 1920's
and 1.22 per cent each 'year during the 1930's, substantially below the
comparable figures for all corporate bonds.
As might be expected, there are some distortions in the above com-
parisons, not the least of which was that because of the small volume
of private placements defaulting, only three years during the 1920's
(1923, 1924, and 1929) witnessed any private placement defaults, and
in these particular three yearsproportion of outstandings default-
ing was close to 1 per cent. In the 1930's defaults as a percentage of
outstandings were much Defaults approached 4 per cent of
outstandings for direct placements in 1935, even though the average
for the decade was only slightly over 1 per cent.
Similar deceptive default rates occur when the comparison is on
direct placements defaulting by year of offering. In individual years of
the 1920's these were quite high (actually 100 per cent in 1929) simply
because of the paucity of direct placement offerings in any one year.
There were, however, only three years of the 1920's containing direct
placement offerings that defaulted. With only a trickle of directly
placed offerings in the 1920's, some 28.9 per cent of the offerings volume
went to default. The reconciliation of low default rates calculated on
outstandings and high default rates calculated on offerings for direct
placements in the 1920's can be made when it is realized that offerings
of direct placements were in much heavier volume in the period prior
to the 1920's than in the 1920's themselves (see Hickman, Volume of
Corporate Bond Financing, Table A-b, pp. 284—285).
TABLE 7
Percentage of Corporate Bond Offerings Bearing Agency Ratings of








Source: Computed from Hickman, Corporate Rond Quality, Table
34, p. 179, and data compiled by Corporate Bond Research Project on
file at NBER.24 Trendsin Corporate Bond Quality
TABLE 8
Default Rates on Offerings of Direct Placements and
All Bonds, by Agency Rating Grades, 1910-39
(percentage of par amount going to default)
Period of
Grades I-IV GradesV-IX
Direct All Direct All
Offerings Placements Bonds Placements Bonds
1910-19 25.4 25.8 98.2 46.0
1920-29 28.8 15.2 0a 44.6
1930-39 1.0 7.0 5.0 37.1
Source: Computed from Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality, Table
34, p. 179, and data compiled by Corporate Bond Research Project on
file at NBER.
aBasedon only three issues.
Direct placements in the prewar period commanded a slightly higher
agency rating than all corporate bonds, as may be seen from Table 7.
Theperiod of greatest difference in quality was obviously that of 1920—
29, when nearly all direct placements were rated as investment grade
in comparison with about four-fifths of all corporate bonds.
The agencies apparently have had a fair record in determining the
quality of direct placement bonds, as may be seen by the much higher
default rates for low-rated bonds than for bonds bearing a high agency
rating (Table 8). On the other hand, it is curious that in the 1920—29
period highly rated direct placements had worse default rates than all
corporate bonds. Undoubtedly of greatest relevance to postwar experi-
ence is the showing of the 1930—39 period, when direct placements re-
ceiving investment quality ratings in grades I—IV showed substantially
lower losses than did all bonds offered in the period.4
During the first two decades of the century, direct placements tended
to be loans to firms with slightly lower earnings coverage than those
whose bonds were publicly offered, but this was not the case for the
period 1920—39. It is clear from Table 9 that by the decade of the
4In1930—36 direct placements comprised less than 10 per cent of the total volume
of offerings, but by 1939 they approached 30 per cent of total offerings (see Hickman,
Volume of Corporate Bond Financing, Table A-b).Direct Placements Versus Public Offerings 25
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Source: Data compiled by Corporate Bond Research Project, on
file at NBER.
1930's the direct placement earnings coverage was considerably better
than that for public offerings.
Direct placements of given quality, it has been noted, are likely to
bear higher yields than public offerings simply because lack of market-
ability, lower issuing costs, and reduction of marketing uncertainty
warrant such treatment. This tendency inevitably should affect the
tabulations of direct placements according to market rating. Actually,
a greater proportion of direct placements than public offerings bore
yields at offering within one percentage point (100 basis points) of the
basic corporate bond yield in the last three decades of the prewar era,
suggesting that most direct placements were of relatively high quality
(see Table 10).
TABLE 10
Percentage of Direct Placements and Public Offerings with











Source: Same as Table 9.26 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
Except for the decade of the 1920's, direct placements have relied
less upon specific security than have publicly offered obligations (Table
11). It is one advantage of the direct placement method that, with
perhaps more access to information about the company, the investor
may require less of the conventional assurances of repayment such as
specific security. Moreover, direct placements may add negative pledges,
working 'capital covenants, and other detailed provisions not present
in public issues.
TABLE 11










Source: Same as Table 9.
As a group, direct placements achieved a favorable default record
as compared with the universe of all bonds, and almost all cx ante
measures of quality favored them. This is not to say, however, that
direct placements are not vulnerable to economic adversity, as they
indeed showed in the middle 1930's.
Direct Placements in the Postwar Period
Direct placements came into their own in the postwar period. They
increased in importance during the 1930's principally because corpora-
tions, fearing failure of their bond offerings in the uncertain markets
of those years, turned to direct negotiations with one or a small group
of purchasers. In the postwar period, however, the direct placement
route became a growing means of financing not dictated from necessity.
Table 2 shows that from 1948 to 1965 direct placements were 46.0 per
cent of all offerings in comparison with only about 7 per cent in theDirect Placements Versus Public Offerings 27
yearsfrom 1900 to 1943. According to the data compiled by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (and shown in Table A1 of this study),
these nonmarketed issues accounted for over half of the total non-
financial corporate bond and note issues in five of the eighteen years
ended in 1965.
A definitional problem inhibits precise comparability of the postwar
data with prewar data on direct placement quality. Hickman's study of
bond quality was largely confined to so-called straight bonds, i.e., issues
with the interest payment not contingent upon income and, most
important, containing a single maturity date. The exclusion of serial
bonds from Hickman's study was necessary in order to allow calculation
of yields which otherwise became vastly complex for any substantial
number of bonds where most of the information on payment schedules
was difficult to obtain. Exclusion of serial bonds had little meaning,
however, in the 1900-43 period because of their small volume. In 1925,
when serial bond offerings reached their peak in dollar volume for
the decade, they accounted for only about 11 per cent of all bond
Not until 1940 was the 1925 volume of serial bonds exceeded,
but in that year serials were still only 11 per cent of total bond volume.
The problem begins in the postwar period, when direct placements
expanded greatly in volume. Since direct placement is ideally suited to
serial payments, or even to payment on an amortized basis, it was no
wonder that bonds with multiple dates of principal payments became
sizable proportion of total direct placements. Because serial bonds in
the private placement sector have become so important a part of the
corporate bond universe, it seems inappropriate to continue to main-
tain the definitional limitations of "straight" bonds only in analyzing
characteristics of quality. In addition, of course, some repayment fea-
ture, either sinking fund or serial payment, is a characteristic of direct
placements.
Direct Evidence on Postwar Quality
The evidence of quality of direct placements leaves something to be
desired. Essentially the reader must decide between series admittedly
covering too short a span and those in which the evaluation limit may
be an extreme one. In essence, however, the findings of both coincide
on the recent direction of quality changes.
Tables A-4 and A-i.28 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
The Gohan Data
Avery B. Cohan of the University of North Carolina, who is partici-
pating in the Natioiial Bureau's study of interest rates, drew a sample
of direct placements made by twenty-three life insurance companies
and one pension fund during the period 1951—61.° The total assets of
these companies as of the end of 1959 were 73 per cent of those of the
industry, and the companies themselves included most of those active
in direct placement lending. Cohan estimates that his sample covered
44 per cent by volume of all direct placements negotiated during the
period. He recorded some eighteen characteristics of direct placement
offerings, including, of course, amount, maturity, security, industry,
size of capitalization, debt ratio, and call protection. One important
characteristic was the number of times the fixed charges (including the
interest cost on the new debt) are covered by earnings before interest
and taxes.
The Cohan sample did not include bonds with warrants or conver-
sion features, but it is representative of ordinary direct placements.
Cohan found two variables of notable significance in accounting for
yield differences between direct placement issues, earnings coverage,
and size of company, and he has classified his offerings by a combina-
tion of these two characteristics to obtain quality classes)' Thus, his
Class 1, or best quality, consisted of issues of firms with capitalization of
over $135 million and earnings coverage of over fifteen times for indus-
trials and six times and over for utilities. His second class included
issues of firms having either (1) capitalization of over $135 million and
coverage for industrials of 5.1—15.0 times earnings and for utilities of
4.0—5.9or(2) capitalization of $45.1—$1350 million and coverage of
over fifteen for industrials and of six and over for utilities. Similar
criteria representing combinations of size and earnings coverage were
established for five other industrial classes and six other utility classes.
This classification system was valid since some correspondence in the
behavior of yield existed between Cohan's classes and several of
Moody's classes by rating grades. Furthermore; Cohan tested his qual-
ity ratings by distributing a sample of 198 agency-rated industrials and
6Iam indebted to Cohan for access to his preliminary tabulations and analyses.
7Itis by no means clear that the lower yield associated with direct placements
to larger firms is a reflection of quality rather than of market power on the part of
the borrower. Some, of course, would hold that market power itself and/or the
diversity that goes with size are in themselves reflections of quality.Direct Placements Versus Public Offerings 29
TABLE12
Distribution of Number of Public Offerings, by Agency Rating,
Cohan Quality Class, and Industrial Group, 1951-61
(percentage of each quality class)
Quality







Industrials 56.1 7.9 1.7
Utilities 45.8 47.6 17.4 16.7 16.7
A
Industrials 19.7 78.9 41.4 19.2
Utilities 9.6 47.6 71.7 66.7 50.0 33.3
Baa
Industrials 3.0 13.2 53.4 61.5 30.0
Utilities 1.6 10.8 16.7 33.3
Ba
Industrials 3.4 19.2 70.0
66.7
Total
Industrials 100.0 100.0 99.9 99.9 100.0
Utilities 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.1 100.0 100.0
Source:Avery B. Cohañ, "Yields on Direct Placements, 1951-6 1,"
National Bureau of Economic Research, in preparation.
a57for industrials.30 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
219 utility offerings made publicly in the 1951—61 period. The results
shown in Table 12, indicates the degree of correspondence between
agency ratings and Cohan's own quality classifications. The distribution
is by number of issues.
Table 13 shows the dollar-value distribution of Cohan's direct place-
ment sample by. major grouping of quality grade for 1951—61. There is
an irregular swing from the prime grades to the lower grades over the
course of the period, but this is in part deceptive because of changes in
the middle group as well. A more precise measure of the quality shifts
(assuming equal value quality grades) is indicated by Chart 3, which
shows the average quality grade for all direct placements in Cohan's
sample. Here the quality deterioration is not so pronounced. Indeed,
apart from the fact that the two beginning years were relatively high
in quality and the last two were years of low quality, it could be said
that there was no change in quality based on this measure.
Over the period covered by the data, Cohan's two quality criteria
were moving in opposite directions; capitalization was increasing and
TABLE 13
Percentage Distribution of Dollar Value of Direct Placements
by Quality Classes, Defined in Terms of Capitalization of
Borrowing Firms and Earnings Coverage, 1951 -61





(millions) 1-3 4-5 6-9 Total
1951 64.8 29.6 5.6 100.0 2,803
1952 53.4 37.8 8.8 100.0 1,185
1953 29.5 54.9 15.6 100.0 906
1954 44.4 41.3 14.4 ioo:i 1,417
1955 24.5 63.9 11.5 99.9 1,471
1956 37.5 52.1 10.4 100.0 1,731
1957 31.4 59.1 9.5 100.0 1,187
1958 52.5 32.1 15.5 100..1 1,171
1959 51.7 29.2 19.2 100.1 851
1960 38.4 42.8 18.8 100.0 1,119
1961 25.8 56.3 18.0 100.1 1,097
Source: Cohan, "Yields on Direct Placements."Direct Placements Versus Public Offerings 31
CHART 3
Average Rating Class for Cohan Sample of Direct 1951—61
RQtinqclass
2
1951'52'53'54'55'56 '57'58 '59'60 '61
Source:Computed from Cohan, "Yields on Direct Placements."
Note: Rating classis defined by amount of pro forma capitalization and pro
for?na interest.
earnings coverage decreasing. The geometric means for the periods
1951—55 and 1956—61 were as follows:
1 951—55 1956—61
Total pro forma capitalization
(millions of dollars)
Industrials 12.8 24.9
Public utilities 11.4 16.1
Times charges earned
Industrials 11.8 8.3
Public utilities 8.1 2.9
Thus, one might expect Cohan's combination quality measure to be
somewhat sluggish in indicating long-run trends.
8FromCohan, "Yields on Direct Placements, 195CHART 4
Earnings
Timescharges earned
Coverage of Direct Offerings Before Taxes,









Source:Medians computed from unpublished dataAvery Cohan.
CHART 5
Ratioof Pro Forma Long-Term Debt to Pro Forma Capitalization








Source: Computed from Cohan, "Yields on Direct Placements."
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If the quality measure combining size of capitalization and earnings
coverage moves in a sluggish manner because of the opposite move-
ments of the characteristics used for classification, what about earnings
coverage alone, a more conventional measure than the combination
favored by Cohan? Chart 4 indicates his findings for the period and
sample he surveyed. The data plotted are medians of annual earnings
coverage for direct offerings and are shown separately for industrials
and public utilities. While there is some variation in the ratios, in
general the chart gives a moderately consistent picture of gradual de-
cline in earnings coverage from 1951 to 1961 for both industry groups.
The industrial median in 1951 was about nine times coverage in com-
parison with about six times coverage in 1961; comparable public
utility medians were four times and three times, respectively. The ratios
are compared with those for public offerings in Chart 10.
One finding of Cohan's has a direct implication for quality: long-
term debt as a proportion of pro forma capital showed very little trend.
Chart 5 shows the yearly average of the ratio of long-term debt to prd
forma capitalization. Thus, at least as far as this measure is concerned,
there is no real tendency of a change in credit quality.
One more piece of evidence on the quality problem is provided by
Cohan. Table 14 compares public offerings and direct placements by
TABLE 14
Comparison of Public Offerings and Direct Placements
by Cohan Quality Classes, 1951-61
(percentage distribution by number of offerings)
QualityClasses
1 2 3 5a 6-8Total
Industrials
Public offerings 33.319.229.313.1 5.1 — 100.0
Direct placements 4.37.616.121.522.827.7100.0
Public utilities
Public offerings 37.928.821.0 8.2 2.7 1.4100.0
Direct placements 0.83.08.518.722.246.8100.0
Source: Cohan, "Yields on Direct Placements."
a57for industrials, public offerings.34 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
his quality classes. Obviously, by this distribution, public offerings ap-
pear to be of much higher quality than direct placements. But since
size was one criterion of Cohan's quality classification, it is possible
that the direct placements, which were of smaller size, may have been
rated down when in other quality criteria such as coverage they were
just as good.
Data of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
Evidence on the proportion of direct placements that have been con-
sidered "investment grade," covering a considerable span of is
provided by the Committee on Valuation of the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (N.A.I.C.).9
In 1910 the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners (prede-
cessor of the N.A.I.C.), through its Committee on Valuation of Securi-
ties, began publication of uniform price lists for the purpose of valuing
securities in insurance company portfolios. The basis for evaluation at
the time was the market price. At roughly the same time, the insurance
industry, led by New York companies, was evolving a doctrine that
fixed-term, "amply secured" bonds not in default would be valued at
cost modified by accrued amortization of discount or premiums. In the
1920's such a method of valuation of fixed-income securities had been
adopted by nearly all states.
Because the privilege of adopting a cost basis for valuation (amor-
tized for premium or discount) was only open for "amply secured"
bonds in good standing, use of a market-price concept for "nonamor-
tizable" securities caused recurrent valuation problems in each crisis
period—1907, 1914, and 1931. With the onset of the Great Depression,
the New York State Insurance Department decided that more attention
should be paid to the quality of bonds and in 1932 notified companies
doing business in that state that only bonds rated in the first five rating
grades by one of the rating agencies would be considered eligible for
amortization on a cost basis. This measure was not fully satisfactory;
during the 1930's the insurance industry was criticized for giving some
bonds amortized valuation even though they sold at quite low market
prices. In 1940 the N.A.I.C. adopted the following criteria for eligi-
9Thisaccount is taken from Harold G. Frame, Valuation of Securities Holdings of
Life Insurance Companies, Homewood, Iii., 1962, pp. 1—16. Only that part of the
valuation process directly applying to quality is here described.-
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bility: (1) bonds rated in the first four grades by two agencies, (2) bonds
rated in the first five grades by three agencies, (3) bonds rated in the
first five grades by two agencies and priced at 55 or better in September,
October, and November. The last test, that of price, was later changed
to a yield spread over U.S. government bonds of 3.9 per cent. Later this
was reduced to 1.5 per cent.
In 1948, an industry committee initiated an inquiry into the per-
formance of bond investments as revealed by the National Bureau's
Corporate Bond Project, the culminating reports on which were the
Hickman study. Evolving out of this study was a two-class reserve
scheme for bonds in good standing to cushion differences between cost
and market price. Falling in the first class, subject to annual reserve
accruals of 0.05 per cent, were corporate bonds in the first four rating
grades or equivalent, while all other good bonds were in the second
class subject to a 1 per cent accumulation rate. In 1953, the N.A.I.C.
specified two tests of eligibility for each class of corporate bonds, as
follows:
Test 1: all bonds in the first four rating grades of one of the
accredited agencies, or debt ratio of 50 to 75 per cent of total capitali-
zation depending on industry, plus average earnings coverage of 1.5
times before taxes over preceding five years and actual coverage of
1.5 times in either of the last two years.
Test 2: earnings requirements of one times average fixed charges for
the last five years and on an actual basis for one of the last two years,
and, for railroad bonds, current assets equal to 125 per cent of current
liabilities.
Public utility and industrial bonds were to have adjusted earnings
equal to mandatory principal payments and sinking-fund requirements
(excluding final maturities) in each year, or working capital equal to
100 per cent of long-term debt. Appropriate modifications in each test
have been made for new enterprises and for special obligations and
guaranteed and contractually supported obligations.'0
Bonds are currently divided by these ratings into two classes. The
first is defined as those bearing either agency ratings in the first four
grades, or earnings coverage of 1.5 times five-year average fixed charges
10Seeprecise statement of tests in Committee on Valuation of Securities, Valuation
Manual, New York, 1959. Further slight modifications have been made from time to
time which, however, have not altered the basic over-all quality standards demanded
of the tests.36 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
plus certain balance sheet conditions dependent in part upon the in..
dustry. In the early postwar period, standards for the top class had been
defined as those falling in the first four rating grades by two agencies,
in the first five by three agencies, or in the first four by two agencies
plus a yield spread varying from less than 3.9 per cent over the yield
of long-term Treasury bonds, as of the last war years, down to a 1.5 per
cent spread in 1950. In 1953, the present standards were adopted. Since
only a few of the postwar years were subject to this different standard,
our remarks will be confined to the definition of bonds currently
ing the first test.
Interviews with bond analysts suggest that few, if any, bonds with
five-year earnings coverage of only 1.5 times would, if rated currently,
bear agency ratings in the first four grades. 'While proof is lacking, the
impression is received that 1.5 times earnings coverage might be the
lower limit of class IV, or Baa, since bonds having other features of
strength might conceivably fall into this class. Interviews with the
N.A.I.C. staff indicate that the troublesome cases—those bonds clearly
deserving Test 1 classification for their equivalence to bonds rated in
the first four agency rating grades, but which are unable to show
adequate earnings coverage—include many obligations of airline and
finance companies. Significantly, both of these industries, because of
vigorous growth patterns, have been increasingly heavy borrowers in
the late postwar period. N.A.I.C. found a number of bonds, which
barely passed the earnings test for Test 1, failed on other grounds—most
importantly, the balance sheet conditions.
These ratings provide an objective measure of quality for bonds con-
sidered as "investment grade," even though the standards as formally
defined do not match those normally used to determine the first four
agency ratings. The N.A.I.C. occupies a respected position as an arm
of the state supervisory agencies of major financial institutions and as
a body of independent analysts taking an objective view of bond qual-
ity. The long-term record of bonds rated in its preferred class is a useful
time series for analysis of changes in bond quality. Thus, the analysis
of the proportion of bonds rated as acceptable for amortization on a
cost basis is a useful measure of changes in bond quality over time.
Determining the N.A.I.C. ratings for direct placement corporate debt
obligations was involved and subject to several types of error. Each
direct placement issue recorded in the semiannual and annual listsDirect Placements Versus Public Offerings 37
compiled by the Investment Dealers' Digest was looked for in the
annual handbook compiled by N.A.I.C. If it was found there, it was
given the rating indicated ("yes" if it passed Test 1 and was therefore
judged to be investment grade and "no" if below investment grade).2-'
Direct placements failed to be listed or were in error if (1) no an-
nouncement was made of the offering in the Investment Dealers' Digest,
(2) the announcement or listing was wrong or misleading, or (3) none
of the placements went to an insurance company and therefore they
were not graded by N.A.I.C. An idea of the total error involved in these
three types of problems may be obtained by comparing columns 7 and
8 of Table A-i, which shows how this study's total of direct placements
compares with those of the SEC. In some years, the total used in this
study was two-thirds or less of the SEC total, probably because some of
the direct placements were not officially announced. The least error
probably comes from direct placements being made outside the life
insurance field, although the possibility of different quality standards
for direct placements taken by pension funds, investment trusts, or
other institutions not subject to rigid investment supervision should
not be overlooked.
Table 15 shows that direct placements rated "no" by N.A.I.C., and
thus equivalent to subinvestment-grade obligations marketed to the
general public, amounted to a maximum of 4.1 per cent in one year
and were usually closer to 1 per cent. This is a better showing than that
made by public offerings, in which the high point was 21 per cent and
4 per cent was common. This finding of the superior quality, as shown
by agency ratings, of direct placements versus public offerings is not
surprising, particularly when the data are confined to obligations pur-
chased by life insurance companies, subject to rigid supervision.
The conclusions from the N.A.I.C. data depend in part on the in-
terpretation of the standards and changes in standards used by that
organization until 1953, when the present tests were adopted. More-
over, in the period after 1953 there is the real question of whether
a 1.5 times earnings coverage can be considered as including bonds of
quality within the first four rating grades. Finally, from 1940 through
11Thedesignation of "yes" indicates the particular security is eligible under the
rules of N.A.I.C. for valuation at cost adjusted by amortization of premium or dis-
count at a rate sufficient to establish a 1 per cent security valuation reserve. Those
designated "no" must be amortized on a 20 per cent basis and, in addition, are
usually valued at a figure specified by the N.A.I.C.38 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
TABLE 15
Bonds Rated as Subinvestment Grade by Rating Agencies,





































1964-65 (2 years only) 19.3 2.8
Source: Based on Tables B-i, B-2, and B-3. Percentages based on
rated bonds only.
aLess than .05.Direct Placements Versus Public Offerings 39
1952, bonds of the fifth rating grade could have been included if they
had passed yield-spread tests. This is contrary to the practice of banking
supervisors, who generally regard investment-quality bonds to be those
ranked in the first four rating grades.12 To identify amortizability stand-
ards in direct offerings with agency ratings of the first four grades iii
public offerings is,therefore, incorrect, but the two standards do
equate if they are regarded as receiving an approved investment status
by supervisory agencies.
Other Evidence
Other data on the quality of direct placements offer corroborative evi-
dence, though they cannot be directly reconciled with the previously
cited material. Two surveys of life insurance company direct place-
ments, although limited in nature, indicate the extent of quality
problems.
The first survey is of a study of direct placements made to inter-
mediate-sized industrial companies by thirteen major life insurance
companies.13 The period covered is from 1946 to 1953, when these
companies accounted for over 90 per cent of the direct placements
in the life insurance industry. The loans examined were those from
$100,000 to $1 million to companies with funded debt not significantly
above $1 million and with assets of $10 million or below. Only loans
classified in the industrial and miscellaneous group were included;
loans to finance companies, loans to nonprofit institutions, oil pay-
ment loans, and very short-term loans were excluded.
Toren states that of 480 loans examined, only two, in the amount of
$1,125,000 (original principal), which were made to the same borrower,
had resulted in loss ($405,000). This compares with gross lending of
$340 million for a loss rate of 0.12 per cent.
As .of December 31, 1953, there were 363 loans in the sample, of
which 351 were in good standing and fully amortizable. Twelve loans
for a face amount of $3,861,850 were not amortizable, or 2.3 per cent
of the $169,201,000 balance outstanding on that date. Of the non-
12SeeBenjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security Analysis
(4th ed.), New York, 1962.
13JamesW. Toren, "Direct Placement Loans of Thirteen Largest Life Insurance
Companies as a Postwar Solution to the Problem of Long-Term Debt-Type Financing
for Intermediate Size Industrial Corporations," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Grad-
uate School of Business, New York University, 1956.40 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
amortizable loans, only three were valued at less than the face amount
of the bond.'4 Toren's data show that for a distinctive group of direct
placement loans of intermediate-sized business firms—firms which might
be expected to be susceptible to quality problems—loss and nonamor-
tizability conditions were relatively slight.
The second survey does not directly reveal default or loss ratios, but
it does cast light on the mysterious process of con-tract modifications in
direct placements. Earlier discussion of quality among direct place-
ments, it will be recalled, indicated that ease of contract modification
might be responsible for a deceptively low volume of defaults in this
category of bonds. A survey of the modification process in direct place-
ments by Harold K. Herzog demonstrates the typical practice in one
major lending Herzog examined the records of a major
life insurance company from 1952 through 1957. This company held
6 per cent of all life insurance company holdings of public utility and
industrial bonds at the end of 1957 and directly placed issues to 208
firms during the 1952—57 period.
Herzog found that 105 of the 208 companies from 1952 to 1957 were
granted 310 modifications of covenants. The covenants were of four
broad categories, which included (1) terms, maturity, etc.; (2) affirma-
tive covenants in which the borrower agreed to maintain property,
books, etc.; (3) negative covenants, such as restricting debt, dividends,
salaries, required working capital; and (4) legal specifications of default,
modifications, indenture, trustees, and so forth. He indicated that direct
placements contained many of the same covenants as public offerings,
but differed from the latter primarily in the greater degree of specifica-
tion and greater application of the affirmative and negative covenants.'6
Herzog found that contract modifications were most frequently made
because the borrowing company grew more rapidly than had been
expected or performed more aggressively. Such cases accounted for 40
per cent of the requests for modification. Thirty-seven per cent of re-
quests for modification were for technicalities unrelated to the course
of the business, and the remaining 23 per cent were requested as a
result of company difficulties of one type or another.17
14 Ibid., p. 252.
15 Harold K. Herzog, "The Modification of Indentures and Promissory Notes Used
in Direct Placement Financing," unpublished M.A. thesis, Graduate School of Busi-
ness, New York University, 1959.
loIbid.,p. 8.
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Herzog cross-tabulates modification requests by cause of request and
covenant requested to be changed. He shows requirements for modifi-
cation involving some debt quality problems, i.e., those due to company
difficulties, industry difficulties, inherent factors, those forced by com-
petition and default avoidance. For the most part, the requests were for
modification of debt limitations or for release of property and mort-
gage contracts. Extensions of maturity or changes in sinking fund re-
quirements were relatively rare, although three of the five modifications
requested "to avoid default" were for changes in these provisions.
This look at contract modifications for one lender for a few years in
the total postwar period suggests that the process of modifying cc n-
tracts on direct placement loans is not merely due to the staving-off
of formal defaults. While nearly one-third of the requests for modi-
fications are motivated by need to relax rigid requirements, frequently
on debt limitations, only a few involve a real inability to make pay-
ments as scheduled.
C